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INTRODUCTION
You decide to take a walk, heading north out the door. As you
begin your journey, you walk through large, gated neighborhoods with
multi-story brick homes, green, luscious lawns, and streets shaded by tall
white oaks and maple sugar trees. Continuing on, you notice a drastic
change. Facing you are dilapidated houses, a plethora of vacant lots, and
deteriorating, minimally maintained streets and infrastructure. The contrast is striking and you cannot help but wonder how long these conditions have existed and whether they will persist. No, this is not a scene
from A Tale of Two Cities. Welcome to St. Louis, Missouri.1
This scene is nothing unique for St. Louis.2 The city, one with a
rich history and vibrant culture, has been plagued by a troubling history
of segregation and racial inequality.3 At the heart of this inequality is an
1 See Chico Harlan, In St. Louis, Delmar Boulevard is the Line That Divides a City by
Race and Perspective, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-st-louis-delmar-boulevard-is-the-line-that-divides-a-city-by-race-and-perspective/
2014/08/22/de692962-a2ba-4f53-8bc3-54f88f848fdb_story.html.
2 See Kevin McDermott, St. Louis Region Still Among Worst In Nation for Black-White
Economic Disparity, Says Report, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 29, 2015), http://
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-region-still-among-worst-in-nationfor-black/article_815c05d5-38bc-5271-ad45-79ef9b0c96e5.html.
3 Cultural Resources Office, A Preservation Plan for St. Louis Part I: Historic Contexts
8—The African-American Experience, STLOUIS-MO.GOV, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/planning/cultural-resources/preservation-plan/Part-I-African-American-Experience.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Preservation Plan for STL].
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overall trend of segregative housing patterns and zoning policies in the
St. Louis metropolitan area—a trend that has bred significant outrage
amongst the St. Louisan minority population.4 This disparity—particularly between the North and South—is evident in the makeup of the city
and counties, and Delmar Boulevard serves as a symbol of this jarring
inequality in St. Louis.5 According to a recent joint study by Washington University and St. Louis University, to the south of Delmar, home
values average $330,000, median incomes are at $47,000, and the population is 70% white, while to the north, home values average $78,000,
median incomes are at $22,000, and the population is 99% African
American.6 The city and counties of St. Louis have attempted to mitigate these racial disparities, but even with the implementation of Fair
Housing initiatives, the disparities endure.7 As tensions have risen over
the decades, so too has the exodus of citizens from the region.8
Given the issues of segregation in St. Louis, city and county officials must effectuate changes to zoning practices that will overcome the
city’s long history of segregation. The U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (“HUD”) recent “Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” makes the need for implementing new zoning
practices in St. Louis even more imperative.9 By mandating affordable
housing production as a prerequisite for development, mandatory inclusionary zoning may be the answer to “affirmatively further” fair housing
and facilitate integration in St. Louis.10
This Note will consider both St. Louis’s history of segregation and
the policies underlying the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). The Note will
then explain how the facilitation of mixed-income communities through
mandatory inclusionary zoning will establish “meaningful actions” to
end segregation and foster the inclusive communities envisioned by
4 Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 15, 2014), http://
prospect.org/article/making-ferguson-how-decades-hostile-policy-created-powder-keg.
5 See WASHINGTON UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS & SAINT LOUIS UNIV., FOR THE SAKE OF ALL: A
REPORT ON THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN ST. LOUIS AND WHY IT
MATTERS FOR EVERYONE 29–30 (2014) [hereinafter FOR THE SAKE OF ALL].
6 Id. at 29 (noting that Delmar Boulevard is the “example of modern-day segregation in
St. Louis”).
7 See Rebecca Rivas, Housing Conference Focuses on Needed Policy Changes, ST.
LOUIS AM.: LOC. BUS. (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.stlamerican.com/business/local_business/
article_372ea42a-d041-11e5-8667-7f3fa1ed79ef.html (noting that current affordable housing
programs in St. Louis create gentrification and segregation and that the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing final rule would help to breakdown segregation that is “maintained . . . by
design”).
8 Colin Gordon, St. Louis Blues: The Urban Crisis in the Gateway City, 33 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 81, 82 (2013) (discussing how St. Louis has fallen from the eighth largest city in
the United States to the fifty-third largest).
9 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (Aug. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
10 Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both Affordable
Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585, 587 (2015).
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HUD’s Final Rule.11 Using this policy framework, this Note will argue
that mandatory inclusionary zoning is a more compelling solution to reverse the detrimental effects of St. Louis’s past zoning practices.12 Accordingly, this Note will proceed in three parts. Part I will set forth the
history of St. Louis’s zoning practices and the FHA’s “Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing” mandate. Part II will explore the different
forms of inclusionary zoning and will make the argument that mandatory
inclusionary zoning is the more compelling choice. Part III will discuss
how region-wide mandatory inclusionary zoning will best facilitate integration and establish compliance with HUD’s Final Rule.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Segregation in St. Louis
1. Early Roots
The racial and economic disparities of St. Louis are a product of
land-use policies conducive to regional segregation and suburban “White
Flight.”13 The earliest discriminatory zoning practices emerged in 1916
in the form of racial-segregation ordinances that prevented homebuyers
from purchasing housing in neighborhoods that were composed of a population made up of 75% of another race.14 Although the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Buchanan v. Warley outlawed this form of segregation,15 the trend of segregationist policies continued.16 Undeterred by
Warley, local communities and neighborhood associations created restrictive covenants blocking ownership and occupation of houses by African Americans,17 subsidized exclusionary suburban developments, and
passed spot zoning policies to prevent African Americans from living
and integrating within white neighborhoods.18
11

24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2015).
See, e.g., Rigel C. Oliveri, Fair Housing and Ferguson: How the Stage Was Set, 80
MO. L. REV. 1053, 1067–69 (2015) (discussing the implications of discriminatory housing
practices on the Michael Brown shooting and subsequent Ferguson riots).
13 See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES 5 (2014) (describing the intents of federal, state,
and local governments to segregate cities).
14 Preservation Plan for STL, supra note 3; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13 at 7 (describing
details of the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange’s referendum which lead to the passing of the
1916 ordinance).
15 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
16 Preservation Plan for STL, supra note 3. Indeed, city officials relied on “race-neutral”
initiatives to create segregation in residential areas. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 7.
17 The Supreme Court would eventually outlaw the use of racial covenants in its
landmark case, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
18 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 13, at 6 (listing the various federal, state, and local policies
used to segregate the St. Louis metropolitan area).
12
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As time progressed, the City continued to implement zoning practices that maintained the segregationist policies.19 For example, the 1942
City Plan Commission reclassified many African American residential
areas to allow for industrial activities.20 These zoning practices permitted the building of taverns, liquor stores, nightclubs, and prostitution
houses in predominantly African American neighborhoods, all of which
ultimately deteriorated these residential areas.21 While conditions in
these neighborhoods worsened, the suburbs began to pass facially neutral
exclusionary zoning policies, such as zoning for large lot, single-family
homes, that made suburban housing unaffordable to all but upper-middle
and high class families, thereby aggravating the segregation.22 To complicate matters, the City introduced segregated public-housing projects
that transitioned many African Americans to the City’s north and further
segregated the metropolitan area.23 Remarkably, even the federal government played a role in this segregation by earmarking certain funds for
these public housing projects.24 Most significantly, the Federal Housing
Administration enacted redlining policies that allowed neighborhoods to
approve, deny, or limit financial services based on racial or ethnic considerations alone.25 These discriminatory policies would ultimately pave
the way for modern-day segregation in St. Louis.26
2. Modern Practices and Further Entrenchment
Even as overt racial segregation in St. Louis declined, opposition to
integration initiatives persisted. Indeed, officials continued to use the
19

Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 8.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 9.
23 Preservation Plan for STL, supra note 3. For an in-depth discussion of the Pruitt-Igoe
Projects and their subsequent failures, see Michael Koh, The St. Louis Problem: Pruitt-Igoe
And the Social Factors That Led to Its Eventual Destruction, THOUGHT CATALOG (May 8,
2014), http://thoughtcatalog.com/michael-koh/2014/05/the-st-louis-problem-pruitt-igoe-andthe-social-factors-that-led-to-its-eventual-destruction/.
24 Camille Phillips, Researcher: St. Louis Segregation is a Legacy of Deliberate Federal
Policy, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Mar. 5, 2016), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/researcher-stlouis-segregation-legacy-deliberate-federal-policy#stream/0.
25 See FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF GREATER BOS., Historical Shift from Explicit to Implicit Policies Affecting Housing Segregation in Eastern Massachusetts: 1934–1968: FHA Mortgage
Insurance Requirements Utilize Redlining, http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/19341968-FHA-Redlining.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). These redlining policies ultimately led
to overt personal and agency bias that affected loan guarantees in favor of white neighborhoods. Id.
26 See Carla Murphy, How Residential Segregation Still Divides St. Louis, COLORLINES
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/how-residential-segregation-still-dividesst-louis (“As any St. Louisan will tell you, you can’t talk about what’s wrong . . . without first
understanding the region’s patchwork of municipal boundaries—holdovers from the Jim Crow
Era . . . .”).
20
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exclusionary zoning policies to ensure that the region’s residential segregation would continue.27 These zoning policies effectively maintained
the blockage of low- to moderate-income families from residing in the
suburbs—a policy that would sustain African-Americans’ entrenchment
in the North County section of St. Louis.28 As time passed, efforts to
facilitate urban renewal emerged, but many of these initiatives fell short
of their intended goals.
This history of segregation came with significant consequences.
City investment declined, which led to decreased home values.29 Moreover, tax bases shrunk in size, which led to lowered education funding,
reduced job opportunities, and diminished community development.30
As a result, areas like North County boast some of the highest poverty
rates.31 Taken together, these factors both cultivated St. Louis’s current
dilapidated state and deprived residents of advancement and growth opportunities.32 Expectedly, despite a decreasing trend over time, St. Louis
continues to boast one of the highest rates of segregation in the United
States.33
3. Government Fragmentation—A Compounding Factor
To fully understand St. Louis’s segregation, we must discuss the
region’s government fragmentation. Beginning in 1876 with the “Great
Divorce,”34 when St. Louis City separated from St. Louis County, this
fragmentation has undoubtedly impacted the area’s racial and economic
27

See id.
Id.
29 FOR THE SAKE OF ALL, supra note 5, at 28.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 30 (indicating that the northern portions of St. Louis have some of the
highest rates of poverty, falling between 19% to 54% of all residents in these areas). These
studies have also noted that areas with higher concentrations of African American residents
often have higher rates of poverty and higher rates of death from chronic disease. Id.
32 See id. at 17–18.
33 EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, WHERE WE STAND, RACIAL SEGREGATION AND DISPARITY 4 (2014); JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, THE PERSISTENCE OF
SEGREGATION IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 5 (Mar. 24, 2011);
see also Leland Ware, The Demographics of Desegregation: Residential Segregation Remains
High 40 Years After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1155, 1165 (2005); .
34 Peter W. Salsich, Jr. & Samantha Caluori, Can St. Louis City and County Get Back
Together? (Do Municipal Boundaries Matter Today?), 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 13,
18–19 (2014). The “Great Divorce” was part of a broader proposal by Missouri to establish
“home rule” in St. Louis City, essentially granting the city a substantial amount of governing
power. Id. at 15. One of the primary reasons driving the City’s split from the County was due
to City residents feeling deprived of their fair share of tax revenue between the city and county
residents. Id. at 20. However, as a result of the separation and the newly created boundaries of
the city, St. Louis City became a landlocked county and assumed St. Louis County’s existing
debt, while St. Louis County continued to grow by annexing existing municipalities, incorporating new municipalities, and establishing urban services in unincorporated areas. Id. at 16.
28
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composition.35 While repeated attempts to re-merge the city and county
have failed,36 to date a total of 17 counties and 309 municipalities have
emerged throughout the St. Louis metropolitan region.37
A major consequence of this fragmentation was the emergence of
home-rule policies amongst the various municipalities in the region.
These policies further divided county and city residents and allowed the
now-fragmented set of municipalities in the county to strengthen their
own wealth and prosperity.38 What materialized was a “patchwork of
insular corporate units” that created a “small subset of affluent localities.”39 Meanwhile, the city fell into despair. The County grew wealthier while the City continued to lose a significant tax base as flight from
the City to the suburbs increased.40
There is no doubt that this fragmentation promoted the outpour of
segregative housing practices that haunt the region today.41 Indeed, as
fair housing advocates explain, the government fragmentation was one of
the most significant factors driving segregation.42 In particular, the current entrenchment of minorities and poverty in Northern St. Louis is a
product of the suburban municipalities’ pervasive and exclusionary
home-rule policies.43 To find a solution that will reinvigorate St. Louis
and break down the long-entrenched segregation that plagues the city,
officials must account for—and potentially dispose of—this
fragmentation.44
B. The Fair Housing Act and HUD’s Final Rule
Congress passed the FHA in 1968 in a concerted effort to prohibit
and eliminate discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.45 The FHA was the first of its kind, setting forth compre35 See Colin Gordon, Patchwork Metropolis: Fragmented Governance and Urban Decline in Greater St. Louis, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 62–65 (2014).
36 See Salsich & Caluori, supra note 34, at 20.
37 Gordon, supra note 35, at 62.
38 Id. at 61.
39 Id. at 63.
40 Id. at 55, 65.
41 Id. at 64.
42 Id. at 67. As the former CEO of the Urban League of Metropolitan St. Louis has
observed, “[M]any of these small communities . . . were created to foster segregation.” Rebecca Rivas, Fragmentation and Segregation, ST. LOUIS AM. (Mar. 5, 2014), http://
www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_768055b6-a4d7-11e3-bceb0019bb2963f4.html.
43 See Gordon, supra note 35, at 64. Even today, it remains a challenge to reconcile the
different interests of the suburbs and City. See id. at 69–70.
44 See Rivas, supra note 42 (noting how Louisville’s merger of city and county governments helped to reinvigorate the city by helping it to attract talent, businesses, and jobs, ultimately leading Louisville to become the 16th largest city in 2003).
45 See Ware, supra note 33, at 1162.
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hensive regulations designed to address housing issues and segregation
in the United States.46 Ultimately, the FHA’s goal was to eliminate
housing discrimination and integrate neighborhoods.47 However, despite
the noble origins of the FHA, the statute was afflicted by significant
shortcomings, including a limited scope of administrative enforcement
and nominal awards for judicial rulings of violations.48 To rectify these
issues, Congress amended the Act in 1988 to provide HUD with expanded power to both enforce the Act and administer stringent sanctions
against prohibited conduct.49
Under the FHA, all federal departments and agencies and state recipients of HUD grants have a duty to “affirmatively further” the policies
of the Act by administering housing and urban development programs.50
Congress created this duty to ensure that federal and state housing agencies actively promoted fair housing and integration while administering
fair housing programs. To satisfy this duty, housing authorities must analyze the impediments to fair housing in their jurisdiction, establish plans
to overcome impediments, and document their efforts.51 A grant recipient’s failure to comply could lead to federal prosecution.52
However, in 2010, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
published a report revealing the ineffectiveness of the “Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing” (“AFFH”) mandate.53 The report indicated
that fair-housing grant recipients were not compliant, mainly a result of
HUD’s failure to maintain adequate oversight.54 Accordingly, HUD revised its guidelines, which culminated with HUD passing the Final Rule
on AFFH in 2015.55
Under the Final Rule, housing authorities must take “meaningful
actions” to end segregation and foster inclusive communities.56 To this
46

See Oliveri, supra note 12, at 1074.
See JORGE ANDRES SOTO & DEIRDRE SWESNIK, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, THE PROMISE OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE ROLE OF FAIR HOUSING ORGANIZATIONS 4 (Jan. 2012)
(discussing how the FHA was enacted in response to a growing racial divide in the country and
with a goal of prohibiting discrimination in real estate transactions).
48 See Ware, supra note 33, at 1162–63.
49 See SOTO & SWESNIK, supra note 47, at 4 (discussing the effect of the 1988 amendments on HUD’s ability to investigate and enforce when housing discrimination is present).
50 See Timothy M. Smyth, Michael Allen, & Marisa Schnaith, The Fair Housing Act:
The Evolving Regulatory Landscape for Federal Grant Recipients and Sub-Recipients, 23 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 231, 233, 236 (2015).
51 Id. at 236.
52 Id. at 238.
53 Id. at 243.
54 See id. at 244.
55 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (Aug. 17, 2015) (to be codified in 24 C.F.R. pt. 5).
56 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2015) (“[T]he purpose of the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) regulations . . . is to provide program participants with an effective planning
approach to aid program participants in taking meaningful actions to overcome historic patterns of segregation, promote fair housing choice, and foster inclusive communities . . . .”).
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end, housing authorities that receive federal grants or assistance must
submit an Assessment of Fair Housing (“AFH”) for HUD approval.57
The standards for approval, however, are substantial. To establish that
they have affirmatively furthered fair housing, housing authorities must
show they have implemented steps to develop affordable housing, removed barriers to such development, and strategically enhanced access
to opportunity.58 Specifically, housing authorities must show “[t]argeted
investment in neighborhood revitalization or stabilization[,] preservation
or rehabilitation of existing affordable housing[,] promot[ion of] greater
housing choice within or outside of areas of concentrated poverty and
greater access to areas of high opportunity[,] and improv[ed] community
assets such as quality schools, employment, and transportation.”59 Although these new regulations are controversial,60 HUD hopes that they
will lead to a significant growth of integrated communities.61

57 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d) (2015); Smyth, Allen, & Schnaith, supra note 50, at 248. Under
the AFH, housing authorities must identify fair housing issues, establish fair housing priorities
and goals, and provide an assessment and identification of “integration and segregation patterns[,] . . . racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty[,] . . . significant disparities in
access to opportunity for any protected classes[,] . . . [and] disproportionate housing needs for
any protected class . . . .” Id.
58 24 C.F.R. § 5.150.
59 Id.
60 See generally LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, REVIEW OF SELECTED CRITICAL COMMENTS ON HUD’S PROPOSED AFFH RULE 2–3 (describing criticisms of
HUD’s Proposed Rule, which included criticisms of a lack of effective complaint and enforcement processes, a lack of balancing in promoting mobility, and a lack of guidance on content
requirements for AFH assessments); Laura Kusisto, New HUD Rules Take Aim at Segregated
Housing, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/hud-announces-rule-designed-to-bolster-so-called-fair-housing-initiatives-1436370563 (noting that critics have “decried” the final rule as forcing integration against the will of residents).
61 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING
GUIDE BOOK 8 (2015). Of course, it is important to note the recent developments in U.S.
politics that will have a profound impact on U.S. housing policy. Following his nomination by
President Trump, Dr. Ben Carson has taken over as the new Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development. Zachary Warmbrodt, Banking Committee Approves Ben Carson Nomination,
POLITICO (Jan. 24, 2017). His nomination will likely put the future of the AFFH Final Rule
into question. See Brendan Gauthier, HUD Secretary Front-Runner Ben Carson Recently
Called Fair Housing “Communist”, SALON (Nov. 28, 2016) (noting that Ben Carson is a
“vocal critic of HUD’s ‘affirmatively furthering fair housing,’” regulation); see also Local
Zoning Decisions Protection Act, H.R. 482, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing a bill that would
nullify the force and effect of the AFFH Final Rule). Yet even if the AFFH Final Rule is
weakened or repealed, the spirit and protections of the FHA—policies that inspired the AFFH
regulation—remain in full force. Moreover, despite the current state of uncertainty, the viability of an inclusionary zoning system remains unscathed. Thus, regardless of what HUD ultimately chooses to do with its current regulations, including AFFH, a system of inclusionary
zoning would continue to promote many of the same policy rationales and social benefits that
underlie the AFFH’s requirements. To understand how and why mandatory inclusionary zoning promotes the spirit and policy of AFFH, see infra Part III.
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ADOPT INCLUSIONARY ZONING

There is a close connection between race and poverty.62 This connection is even more prevalent in St. Louis. Although city officials have
attempted to promote integration,63 any practical solution to alleviate the
plights of St. Louis’s racial disparity and concentration of poverty must
break down existing barriers and open new opportunities for those who
have traditionally been left behind. One way to potentially facilitate
community integration is through a greater volume of mixed-income living arrangements.64 Cue inclusionary zoning.
Under a typical inclusionary zoning ordinance, local governments
require developers to integrate affordable housing into new developments as a prerequisite for allowing the development.65 The affordable
housing infrastructure facilitated by inclusionary zoning—in particular,
mandatory inclusionary zoning—should, in turn, provide substantial socioeconomic benefits to the St. Louis region through the mandated creation of mixed-income communities. Moreover, in light of recent
developments from HUD, the use of mandatory inclusionary zoning can
serve as a practical way for cities to comply with HUD’s Final Rule on
AFFH.66 The following will contemplate the necessary considerations
and strategies that should go into developing a plan for inclusionary zoning in St. Louis.
A. Inclusionary Zoning—Why a Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning
Policy is Compelling
In response to exclusionary zoning practices, such as large minimum lot sizes and multifamily residential area limitations, city and local
governments began passing inclusionary zoning laws in an effort to promote integration and affordability in their communities.67 These inclu62 See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF WEALTH: HOW AGE,
EDUCATION AND RACE SEPARATE THRIVERS FROM STRUGGLERS IN TODAY’S ECONOMY ESSAY
NO. 1, at 9–10 (2015).
63 See, e.g., ST. LOUIS HOUS. AUTH., SECTION 8 (HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER) BASIC
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (2016), http://www.slha.org/for-residents/section-8/.
64 See generally Diane K. Levy, Zach McDade, & Kassie Bertumen, Mixed-Income Living: Anticipated and Realized Benefits for Low-Income Households, 15 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y
DEV. & RES. 15, 22–24 (2013) (noting how mixed-income communities can succeed in desegregating households). Note that these researchers have acknowledged that mixed-income
housing alone does not help to advantage the poor. Id. That said, a comprehensive policy,
mixed in with the proper form of mixed-income housing may help to alleviate some of the
traditional limitations of mixed-income housing projects. See infra Part II.B for an extended
discussion on some potential facilitating policies.
65 Brian R. Lerman, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the Affordable
Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383, 387–88 (2006).
66 See Rivas, supra note 7. For an in-depth discussion on how mandatory inclusionary
zoning can make St. Louis compliant with AFFH, see infra Part III.C.
67 See Lerman, supra note 65, at 386.
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sionary zoning laws helped to reverse exclusionary practices and
promote greater opportunities for affordable housing where such housing
would not otherwise have been provided.68 Moreover, these inclusionary
zoning laws typically offered a multitude of benefits for the community,
including racial integration, strengthened economic environments, and
protection against displacement of low-income families.69 Over time, inclusionary zoning programs have developed into two distinct alternatives: voluntary and mandatory.70
1. Voluntary Inclusionary Zoning—Lacking the Incentives
Under a voluntary inclusionary zoning system, municipalities utilize
an incentive-based structure in their zoning codes to entice developers to
include affordable housing in their plans.71 For example, Chicago grants
access to discounts and density bonuses if the developer either includes
affordable housing or pays a fee.72 However, if you opt not to pursue the
benefits afforded by inclusionary development, you are not barred from
developing housing.73
Some cities have found success in utilizing a voluntary inclusionary
zoning program,74 and there are certainly merits to a policy that is more
flexible than its mandatory counterpart.75 However, voluntary inclusionary zoning carries significant disadvantages. For one, the level of incentives required to entice development of affordable housing is not
necessarily in the best interest of the municipality as a whole.76 Moreover, the fact that developers have a choice in the process makes the
proliferation of affordable housing a more challenging endeavor.77 Despite the affordable housing goals inherent in voluntary inclusionary zon68

Id. at 389.
Cecily T. Talbert & Nadia L. Costa, Current Issues in Inclusionary Zoning, 37 URB.
LAW. 513, 515 (2005).
70 Lerman, supra note 65, at 389.
71 See id. at 391.
72 AM. PLANNING ASS’N, ZONING PRACTICE 4 (Mar. 2007) (describing the “Chicago
Way” and how it reflects the “goals and philosophies of the Daley administration”).
73 Id.
74 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Inclusionary Zoning and Mixed-Income Communities, HUDUSER.GOV (2013), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring13/
highlight3.html (describing how New York City opted to pursue a voluntary inclusionary zoning program to “encourage developer participation and give the city the opportunity to monitor
the program” and noting that the system has produced more than 1,700 affordable units) [hereinafter HUD User].
75 Lerman, supra note 65, at 391 (noting that voluntary programs provide developers
“with the element of choice, thereby avoiding a major obstacle of mandatory programs”).
76 Id. As Lerman notes, the number of incentives required to induce development must
exceed—not just offset—the costs of building affordable units. Id.
77 Id. (noting how, under a voluntary program, if the ultimate market-rate buyer is willing to pay a premium that exceeds the public incentives for affordable housing, the developer
will not develop affordable housing).
69
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ing, such programs generally struggle to encourage the production of
affordable housing for low-income families.78
These shortcomings demonstrate the untenable nature of voluntary
inclusionary zoning for a city like St. Louis that is desperately in need of
the integrative effects of inclusionary zoning. The idea of flexibility and
choice sounds great on paper, but in practice, because of the sheer volume of concessions and incentives required to entice developers, this
flexibility has counterproductive effects on the community. Luckily,
these limitations have given way to another breed of inclusionary zoning—mandatory inclusionary zoning.79
2. Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—Providing the Necessary
Push
Eschewing the choice inherent in voluntary inclusionary zoning, a
mandatory inclusionary zoning system requires that developers who pursue a particular development project must allocate a portion of their units
to affordable housing.80 However, many of these mandatory inclusionary zoning mandates provide density bonuses and other incentives that
compensate developers for the municipality’s zoning mandates, though
to a lesser degree than voluntary inclusionary zoning.81 The net effect of
these policies is to guarantee that affordable housing grows in conjunction with new development.82
Mandatory inclusionary zoning boasts several key benefits over its
voluntary counterpart. First, mandatory inclusionary zoning programs
better facilitate the production of affordable housing by requiring the
production of these affordable housing units.83 As a result, these programs are more capable of producing housing that serves the needs of
78 See Michael Floryan, Comment, Cracking the Foundation: Highlighting and Criticizing the Shortcomings of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039,
1045 n.23 (2010).
79 See NICK BRUNICK, LAUREN GOLDBERG, & SUSANNAH LEVINE, BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY HOUSING? PRODUCTION, PREDICTABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (2003) (explaining how the benefits of mandatory
inclusionary zoning have prompted municipalities to adopt such programs over voluntary inclusionary zoning).
80 Lerman, supra note 65, at 390. It bears noting that developers may choose to develop
units in the form of off-site housing or to pay a fee in lieu of developing affordable units—
indeed, such alternatives are required for mandatory inclusionary zoning programs to be valid
exercises of governmental power. Id.
81 Id. at 390 n.55.
82 See id. at 390
83 For example, Cambridge, Massachusetts, a jurisdiction that failed to produce any affordable housing units after ten years of implementing voluntary inclusionary zoning policies,
saw a total of 135 affordable homes built by shifting to mandatory inclusionary zoning policies. BRUNICK, GOLDBERG, & LEVINE, supra note 79, at 2–3.
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low-income families.84 Second, because mandatory inclusionary zoning
requires the production of mixed-income housing, such programs better
integrate neighborhoods and decentralize concentrations of poverty—
critical reforms that will benefit a fragmented region like St. Louis.85
However, like voluntary inclusionary zoning, mandatory inclusionary zoning has its own drawbacks. Indeed, critics argue that the benefits,
such as density bonuses, that some municipalities offer are not enough to
constitute just compensation for a developer’s lost profits.86 Moreover,
critics note that mandatory inclusionary zoning policies often lead to
costly delays in development due to the challenges to high density planning that often follow after affordable housing mandates.87 Finally, critics argue that the alternatives, such as in-lieu fees, that municipalities
impose on developers who forgo inclusionary development are seldom
used to further inclusionary zoning’s goal of promoting affordable housing development.88
Many of these concerns can be mitigated. Although concern over
potential decreases in new development may be valid, critics underestimate how well a comprehensive set of trade-off benefits will encourage
investment and development over time.89 In fact, recent studies of Californian cities show that contrary to the critical assessments, mandatory
inclusionary zoning programs and their benefits lead to overall increases
in housing production.90 Moreover, in spite of criticisms to the contrary,
developers would likely consider the right mix of benefits to be fair compensation for an affordable housing mandate, especially when many of
these benefits would not otherwise be available in a normal development
scheme.91 Finally, a widespread mandate will firmly establish general
predictability regarding development in the region that should, in due
time, counteract any “delays” that may arise from initial challenges. Indeed, developers are typically well aware of the mandates or fees and
requisite incentives that are available and often view them as mere con84

See id. at 4.
See Lerman, supra note 65, at 390.
86 Floryan, supra note 78, at 1090–91.
87 Id. at 1094.
88 Id. at 1100 n.358 (explaining that in-lieu fees are seldom used to develop affordable
housing).
89 Thomas Silverstein, In Light of Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in San Jose,
California Case, The Time Is Right to Advocate for Inclusionary Zoning, LAWYERS’ COMM.
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW (Mar. 8, 2016), https://lawyerscommittee.org/2016/03/lightsupreme-courts-denial-certiorari-san-jose-california-case-time-right-advocate-inclusionaryzoning/.
90 See BRUNICK, GOLDBERG, & LEVINE, supra note 79, at 6–7 (citing five cities that have
switched from a voluntary program to a mandatory program and saw increases in affordable
housing production).
91 See, e.g., CAL. AFFORDABLE HOUS. LAW PROJECT & W. CTR. ON LAW & POVERTY,
INCLUSIONARY ZONING: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 19–23 (2002).
85
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tingencies for development.92 Even with its shortcomings, mandatory
inclusionary zoning is an attractive land-use policy for St. Louis, and one
that, if properly implemented, may potentially integrate communities
over the next several decades.
B. Important Considerations for Implementing Mandatory
Inclusionary Zoning
It is important to note that some studies have concluded that mixedincome housing alone is not as effective without other services and support in the community in place.93 Although a mandatory inclusionary
zoning program can help to make large strides in fostering important
social policies, these programs must nonetheless go beyond the traditional offerings of mixed-income communities. As some studies have
explained, this can include (1) implementing more financial policies and
job training to set low-income families towards the path of homeownership and financial stability, (2) providing greater social services like
childcare and transportation to these new low-income residents, and (3)
creating stronger neighborhood associations to help eradicate the social
stigma attached to low-income residents.94
Although the current iterations of mixed-income housing projects
have led to limited improvements thus far, the literature is clear that the
potential benefits of a mixed-income program can go far in improving
the conditions of low-income families if implemented correctly.95
Adopting a mandatory program that takes account of additional considerations should ensure the consistent availability of affordable housing for
low-income residents in new areas of development with the various benefits that affordable housing can offer. Therefore, by applying
mandatory inclusionary zoning programs to facilitate AFFH Final Rule
requirements and adopting facilitative measures to help ease the transition to these new neighborhoods, this latest iteration of mixed-income
developments could succeed where others have failed. The challenge,
however, lies in the implementation.

92

Id.
See Levy, McDade, & Bertumen, supra note 64, at 17–18.
94 James C. Fraser, Robert J. Chaskin, & Joshua Theodore Bazuin, Making Mixed-Income Neighborhoods Work for Low-Income Households, 15 CITYSCAPE 83, 90–94 (2013).
95 See id. at 94–95; Levy, McDade, & Bertumen, supra note 64, at 22.
93
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A. The Regional Framework
Traditionally, municipalities will pass inclusionary zoning ordinances to address local housing needs, market conditions, and community development trends.96 However, the implementation of inclusionary
zoning in St. Louis must be a widespread endeavor. Successful integration will require that government officials change course from current
policies in place and move the focus from the northern municipalities of
the city to the entire metropolitan region.97
To this end, the fragmentation between the city and the counties
remains the biggest impediment to successfully instituting any inclusionary zoning policy. Local municipalities are typically responsible for implementing zoning laws,98 but here, relying on each of the St. Louis
municipalities to individually implement inclusionary zoning laws would
be counterproductive. Although civil leaders do believe that the “Great
Divorce” was a mistake, many county residents do not, and that inevitably influences local policy.99 Plainly, the fragmented nature of St. Louis
would make any widespread change difficult, if not impossible—if one
locality implements an inclusionary zoning law, another may choose not
to and encourage population flight.100
The solution to this issue requires a region-wide resolution that
binds the various municipalities of the St. Louis metropolitan region and
prevents the inevitable prisoner’s dilemma that would occur if relying on
local-level implementation.101 By implementing inclusionary zoning at a
96 See, e.g., OR. INCLUSIONARY ZONING COAL., WHITE PAPER: INCLUSIONARY ZONING IN
OREGON 2 (2014) (describing how inclusionary zoning laws are developed locally and how
their customizability make them attractive to local housing policy).
97 Rivas, supra note 7 (explaining that most housing funding in Missouri goes to North
St. Louis).
98 See generally Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that a zoning
ordinance is a valid use of a locality’s police power and therefore constitutional).
99 See Salsich & Caluori, supra note 34, at 16–17. The City had presented five separate
proposals to reverse the “Great Divorce,” but almost all have failed. Id. at 16. The one exception is the proposal for a Metropolitan Sewer District, which was ultimately an incremental
change. Id.
100 See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative
Major Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 387 (1994) (describing, in the public
housing context, how it is “difficult to locate minority occupied public housing in white neighborhoods” and how “white flight may well result if such placement occurs”).
101 Oregon is an example of a state that has adopted a region-wide zoning law. See Myron
Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 893–94 (2006). Under Oregon law, each metropolitan service district must adopt an urban growth boundary plan to help limit the amount of land
available for conversion to urban use. Id. One such district is Portland, which tailored its
boundary plan to meet its metro-region’s needs. Id. at 894–95. The urban growth plan helped
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regional level—likely through state legislation that would preempt the
municipalities’ zoning decisions102—St. Louis officials can ensure that
the influence of inclusionary zoning resonates across municipality lines
and has region-wide effects. An umbrella approach to inclusionary zoning planning will help ensure that the municipalities, fragmented as they
may be, cannot insulate themselves from the requirements of inclusionary zoning or the AFFH mandate.103 This regional planning strategy
would not be unusual, and it would help to advance integration in a region where social and economic class self-preservation amongst the various municipalities remains prevalent.104
Of course, this approach would not be without controversy. Many
feel that a regional or state body’s imposition of land use regulations
would be nothing more than another imposition of the “state or regional
body’s will on local governments.”105 These criticisms are a legitimate
concern, but nonetheless overlook—or at the very least undervalue—the
need to prevent the detrimental practices that will inevitably arise if individual municipalities are each left to their own devices. St. Louis, in
particular, is prone to adverse effects when the various municipalities are
allowed to make self-serving decisions—a fact supported by the prevalence of white flight and the mismatch of priorities between the counties
and the City.106 Granting state or regional authorities a wide scope of
to decrease segregation in the Portland region. Id. at 900–03. These urban growth boundary
zones have also been important in helping to make Portland one of the “most class-integrated
metropolitan areas in the country.” Id. at 903.
102 Johnstone, supra note 100, at 405.
103 There are some scholars that argue that the stratification of these communities is an
economically inefficient outcome. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1199–1200 (1981) (arguing that economic integration is inefficient in part due to how upper-income families disvalue proximity to low-income groups).
This Note recognizes the complexity of the arguments both supporting and criticizing the
economic underpinnings of inclusionary zoning, and that inclusionary zoning must not necessarily be implemented in isolation of other complementary policies. See supra Part II.B. Although this Note will not get into a deep discussion of the competing economic arguments
underlying inclusionary zoning, this Note does contend that inclusionary zoning polices have
legitimate economic benefits, and potential justifications that outweigh Ellickson’s concerns.
See infra note 156 and accompanying text. These benefits, in particular, help drive many of
the social policies underlying AFFH. Cf. infra Part III.B.1–4.
104 Johnstone, supra note 100, at 409.
105 See John R. Nolon, Grassroots Regionalism Through Intermunicipal Land Use Compacts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011, 1012–13 (1999).
106 Indeed, white flight has played a major role in the composition of North St. Louis. If
any meaningful change is to come about, the region as a whole must be locked into this
process. See Malcolm Gay, White Flight and White Power in St. Louis, TIME (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://time.com/3107729/michael-brown-shooting-ferguson-missouri-white-flight/ (describing
how “the wealthier population of St. Louis has always been running from poverty”); Molly
Patterson, How White—And Middle-Class—Flight Continues to Shape North St. Louis County,
T HE R OOT . COM (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2014/08/
how_white_flight_shaped_north_st_louis.html (describing how “when middle-class families . . . flee a neighborhood, a school, a county . . . they take resources with them”).
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regulatory power is certainly a policy that must be carefully approached,
but a regional plan in this case will ensure that St. Louis realizes meaningful change.107
B. Two Goals, One Policy: Social and Economic Integration Though
AFFH Compliance
Under HUD’s AFFH Final Rule, city officials in areas receiving
HUD funding must demonstrate “targeted investment in neighborhood
revitalization or stabilization[,] preservation or rehabilitation of existing
affordable housing[,] promot[ion of] greater housing choice within or
outside of areas of concentrated poverty and greater access to areas of
high opportunity[,] and improve[d] community assets such as quality
schools, employment, and transportation.”108 As it stands, both the city
of St. Louis and its counties receive HUD funding.109 Unsurprisingly,
then, the burden is on city and county officials to ensure AFFH compliance. Such compliance is a high bar that will require St. Louis officials
to carefully plan and assess the current housing climate and social composition of neighborhoods and municipalities.
That said, a region-wide mandatory inclusionary zoning plan will be
important for St. Louis to both successfully comply with the new regulations and, in turn, promulgate meaningful social change to reverse decades of segregative policies. The following will consider exactly how
region-wide mandatory inclusionary zoning will help to satisfy these
AFFH requirements.110

107 Importantly, the benefits of a regional inclusionary zoning program will only implicate
new construction. Any fully mature suburb, for example, will not become more inclusionary
by virtue of these new regional policies. An increase in general housing demand in the area,
however, should help to make the effects of inclusionary zoning resonate more broadly across
the region over time, assuming that a steady increase in development is in place.
108 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2015).
109 See Press Release, Stlouis-Mo.Gov, City of St. Louis Civil Rights Enforcement
Agency Hosts Fair Housing Conference, (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/civil-rights-enforcement/news/crea-housing-conference.cfm (noting the
counties in St. Louis that receive HUD funding). For example, in 2015, HUD announced that
they would provide more than $26 million to St. Louis County for residential and commercial
development. See Jason Rosenbaum, HUD Chief Castro Awards St. Louis County $26 Million
in Development Funds, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Aug. 19, 2015). Moreover, in 2014, HUD
provided St. Louis City with a $2.5 million grant to provide lead remediation for families in
the city.
110 This analysis reflects extrapolations of existing data as applied to inclusionary zoning
in furtherance of AFFH. This area, however, is one that would benefit from increased
research.
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1. Targeted Investment in Neighborhood Revitalization and
Stabilization
Implementing mandatory inclusionary zoning should promote investment that would have stabilizing and revitalizing effects. The implementation may initially decrease total development activity, which
reflects a natural adjustment period. Despite this initial decrease in the
rate of production, however, the total number of units per investment
should eventually increase over time.111 Such increase would result from
cities forcing developers to ultimately produce high-density developments.112 Moreover, the creation of affordable housing units throughout
predominantly affluent and wealthy areas of the region should help, in
the long term, spread individuals across the region and allow for increased flexibility and mobility.113 What will result is a socioeconomic
revitalization of these new members in the community, particularly given
that access to certain areas have historically been only open to those who
were more privileged.
A risk of mandatory inclusionary zoning is that the increased costs
associated with it will push costs on to those who need the housing
most.114 However, the use of sufficiently incentivizing cost offsets
should mitigate these concerns. Whether in the form of affordable housing cost offsets or in-lieu fees, a mandatory inclusionary zoning program
will incentivize development115 and promote targeted investment and revitalization in communities under AFFH.
111

See NICHOLAS BRUNICK, BUS. & PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE IMPACT
ZONING ON DEVELOPMENT 5 (2003) (noting that “a review of sample inclusionary communities indicates a significant number of new affordable units continue to be
produced” and that “[n]o evidence exists that development has slowed in these communities”);
Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 46 (1996); see also FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE &
URBAN POL’Y, HOUSING POLICY BRIEF: THE EFFECTS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING ON LOCAL
HOUSING MARKETS: LESSONS FROM SAN FRANCISCO, WASHINGTON DC AND SUBURBAN BOSTON AREAS 7–8 (2008), http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/IZPolicyBrief.pdf (explaining how the Washington, Boston, and San Francisco areas all have seen increases in affordable
units in areas where inclusionary zoning is in place but and also noting that there is no evidence that inclusionary zoning programs have an impact on either the price or production of
market-rate houses in some of those areas).
112 Dietderich, supra note 111, at 46, 69.
113 See Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 521 (2007).
114 See BRUNICK, supra note 111, at 4–5 (describing some of the potential actions a developer could take without proper cost offsets for inclusionary zoning mandates).
115 Id. at 17–18 (describing the different communities with inclusionary housing programs, the number of units the programs produced, the set-aside requirements the programs
used, the density bonuses the programs offered, and other incentives the programs provided to
developers).
OF INCLUSIONARY
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2. Preservation or Rehabilitation of Existing Affordable Housing
The preservation and rehabilitation of affordable housing is a critical method to promote livability—hence its emphasis under AFFH. One
factor that makes St. Louis such an attractive candidate for the implementation of a mandatory inclusionary zoning scheme is its commitment
to promoting greater affordability. To date, the city of St. Louis has established a multitude of affordable housing programs, a result of a $500
million investment in affordable housing projects between 2003 and
2014.116 Of course, more needs to be done given the lukewarm success,
but it is nonetheless important that any policy promoting affordable
housing preserve the existing stock.
Mandatory inclusionary zoning offers that very policy. One of the
cornerstones of an inclusionary zoning program is its creation and preservation of affordable housing units into new communities.117 The end
result should be the complementing and facilitating of existing affordable
housing initiatives in St. Louis, while the variety and quantity of affordable choices inevitably rise in the form of integrated mixed-income
neighborhoods.
It is important to note that mandatory inclusionary zoning is only
one of many solutions necessary to promote affordability and integration
within the city. Indeed, many have pointed out that inclusionary zoning
policies should exist within a “broader and more comprehensive” system.118 An inclusionary system should recognize that merely developing
affordable housing is not enough—a system that integrates the region’s
communities must be in place to preserve and support current affordable
housing initiatives. By implementing a system that integrates communities, not just builds houses in the same, poverty-stricken areas, the inclusionary zoning regime can foster a desegregation of the city while adding
to the preservation, maintenance, and development of affordable housing
in the St. Louis region—all with an eye towards integration and affordability. As the menu of possibilities increases, so too does the availability of existing options. By facilitating AFFH’s goal of affordable
housing preservation, mandatory inclusionary zoning will in turn allow
officials to focus on unlocking areas of the region that have historically
been off-limits to low-income families.
116

AFFORDABLE HOUS. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 5 (2014).
See, e.g., HUD User, supra note 74 (describing how the New York City “Marketplace
Plan” will create and preserve 165,000 affordable homes for city residents or mixed-use
development).
118 CTR. FOR HOUS. POL’Y, FURMAN CTR., THE EFFECTS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING ON
LOCAL HOUSING MARKETS: LESSONS FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO, WASHINGTON DC, AND SUBURBAN BOSTON AREAS 9–10 (2014).
117
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3. Greater Housing Choice and Access to Opportunities Away
from Concentrated Poverty
Evidence shows that the creation of economically and socially integrated communities can help to combat concentrations of poverty.119
With this in mind, an inclusionary zoning mandate can easily satisfy
AFFH’s third prong: promotion of greater housing choice outside of areas of concentrated poverty and greater access to areas of high opportunity. One of the key characteristics of mandatory inclusionary zoning is
its production of large quantities of affordable housing units in conjunction with the development of market-rate housing.120 Because of this
focus on mixed-income communities, many of these affordable units will
end up in low-poverty neighborhoods.121 Such outcomes should look
promising to advocates of inclusionary zoning, and the results would be
no different in St. Louis.
As more affordable housing opportunities develop in historically affluent areas of St. Louis, low-income residents will benefit from the uptick in housing choices in locations that have traditionally been out of
reach to those below the poverty line.122 These increases of affordable
housing choices, in turn, would allow previously entrenched low-income
families to transition to new communities. And growing housing choices
will help afford greater opportunities to break out of the status quo.
Moreover, a region-wide plan would help facilitate this growth by curtailing any risk of mass-flight from these newly integrated neighborhoods. The end result, as mandated by AFFH, is a promulgation of

119 See Constanine E. Kontokosta, Mixed-Income Housing and Neighborhood Integration: Evidence from Inclusionary Zoning Programs, 36 J. URB. AFF. 716, 736–37 (2014) (concluding that, in the aggregate, inclusionary zoning units increase the level of both racial and
income integration above those neighborhoods without inclusionary zoning). Kontokosta’s
study goes on to state that inclusionary zoning can be an effective policy to counter racial
segregation but notes three limitations that policy makers, including those who would be implementing inclusionary zoning in St. Louis, should address: (1) we need better data collection; (2) the success of programs is still contingent on housing market conditions and
community reactions to these programs; and (3) that the current allocations of units after construction is not proportionate to the eligible population. Id. at 737.
120 See BRUNICK, supra note 111, at 6, 8 (describing how development of housing under
inclusionary zoning programs has been rapid and has not impacted the development rate of
market-rate housing).
121 About 76% of inclusionary zoning homes were located in low-poverty neighborhoods,
while only 2.5% were in areas considered “high-poverty.” HEATHER L. SCHWARTZ ET AL.,
RAND CORP., IS INCLUSIONARY ZONING INCLUSIONARY? A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 13–14
(2012).
122 Moreover, what is great about this policy is that the effects are not just limited to lowincome families. Middle-income residents will also benefit from the effects of inclusionary
zoning. See Kontokosta, supra note 119, at 737.
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increased housing choices and access to opportunities through the dissolution of St. Louis’s historically black-white dichotomy.123
4. Improving Community Assets Such as Quality Schools,
Employment, and Transportation
In addition to generating increased investment in the city, preserving existing affordable housing, and expanding access to housing
choices, mandatory inclusionary zoning will further the community-improvement components of AFFH. As the following will reveal, the implementation of this policy will ultimately benefit St. Louis in a number
of complementary manners, including increased community development, economic growth, and bolstered job opportunities.
a. Increase Community Development—Access to Quality
Schools and Increased Education
Access to education is one of the fundamental building blocks
needed to achieve community development and integration. Not surprisingly, this is one of the critical policy goals underlying mandatory inclusionary zoning. Although not a tremendous amount of research exists on
the relationship between residing in lower-poverty school districts and
familial benefits, the existing research does indicate a correlation between a neighborhood’s affluence and its residents’ quality of life and,
more importantly, its residents’ educational welfare.124 From this, one
can see how offering more affordable housing through mixed-income
community development in affluent areas should increase overall educational quality for a broader spectrum of people in a region.125
123 Of course, decades of segregative housing practices cannot be undone in the stroke of
a pen. However, the requisite steps to accomplish inclusionary zoning will allow St. Louis to
show that it is AFFH compliant.
124 See Lan Deng, Comparing the Effects of Housing Vouchers and Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits on Neighborhood Integration and School Quality, 27 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 20,
31–32 (2007); see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 121, at 9–10 (“Research about the effects
of poverty in neighborhoods and schools suggests that [inclusionary zoning] recipients have
better life chances to the degree that [inclusionary zoning] policies provide low-income persons access to low-poverty neighborhoods and high-performing schools.”). Schwartz et al.
note a study in 2012 that tracked the schooling outcomes of Montgomery County children who
lived in affordable housing through the county’s inclusionary zoning policy. SCHWARTZ ET
AL., supra note 121, at 9. The study found that those children who attended low-poverty
schools and lived in public housing outperformed those children who attended higher-poverty
schools and lived in public housing. Id. Schwartz et al. do acknowledge, however, that there
is a “dearth of research,” but they recognize that the existing research does indicate a strong
correlation between low-poverty places and the positive conditions therein. Id. at 10.
125 In fact, research has shown that “school quality is one of the most important determinants of residential location,” particularly because standardized test scores are correlated with
school quality. Deng, supra note 124, at 28–30.
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As it pertains to St. Louis, many of the best schools are located in
the region’s most affluent areas.126 Thus, any meaningful change to educational outcomes in St. Louis must focus on providing greater access to
these schools. Mandatory inclusionary zoning provides a ready solution.
The key is its proliferation of mixed-income communities. With increases in social and economic integration, more families, especially
those in low-income brackets, will be able to capitalize on this new access to higher-quality schooling opportunities. As access to education
increases, so too should educational performances. The result is an uptick
in the positive education outcomes that can beneficially influence community integration and development—the very outcomes envisioned and
encouraged by AFFH.127
b. Develop Economic Growth Through Bolstered Job
Opportunities
Since the 2008 recession, St. Louis has struggled to recover.128
However, the counties and the City have not borne these struggles
equally. The counties boast unemployment rates far below the national
average; meanwhile, the City maintains unemployment rates that are
above the national average.129 This disparity in unemployment rates is
126 See Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, the Continuing Tragedy of Ferguson,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/ferguson-school-segregation
(explaining the stark educational and schooling differences between the Normandy School
District in Ferguson, MO, a predominantly poor and segregated area, and the Clayton Public
Schools in Clayton, MO, a predominantly white and affluent city in St. Louis County). Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Ladue City, Missouri, CENSUS.GOV, http://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2939656 (last visited Nov. 29, 2016) (reporting
a median household income (in 2014 dollars) of $179,464 in Ladue), and MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., LADUE DISTRICT REPORT CARD,https://mcds.dese.mo.gov/
guidedinquiry/School%20Report%20Card/District%20Report%20Card.aspx?rp:School
Year=2016&rp:DistrictCode=096106 (last visited Nov. 29, 2016) (reporting that the Ladue
School District has a 98.40% graduation rate (the Missouri average is 88.9%) for 2016 and that
81.7% of its graduates go on to a 4-year college or university (the Missouri average is 37.5%)),
with U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: St. Louis City, Missouri, CENSUS.GOV, http://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/29510 (last visited Nov. 29, 2016) (reporting a
median household income (in 2014 dollars) of $34,800), and MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY &
SECONDARY EDUC., https://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/School%20Report%20Card/Dis
trict%20Report%20Card.aspx?rp:SchoolYear=2016&rp:DistrictCode=115115 (last visited
Nov. 29, 2016) (reporting that the St. Louis City School District has a 71.45% graduation rate
and that 34.1% of its graduates go on to a 4-year college or university).
127 The main thrust here is that many of these school districts have a strong tax base that
support these schools. Although there could be fears that low-income families will make it
more difficult to fund education over time, it is important to remember that an inclusionary
zoning program is developing both affordable housing and fair-market housing, which should
help continue to fund schooling.
128 Jim Gallagher, St. Louis Has a Jobs Problem, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 22,
2015), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-has-a-jobs-problem/article_fe9a7ae0832c-590e-b14f-402541d7c96d.html.
129 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ST. LOUIS AREA ECONOMIC STUDY 1 (2016).
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likely compounded by the location of St. Louis’s top employers. Of the
region’s top fifty employers, only fifteen are located in the City.130 Only
about 24% of jobs in the area are reachable within 90 minutes via public
transportation.131 There are jobs in St. Louis, but not being able to reach
them negates their benefits.132
Although troubling, the foregoing statement should come as no surprise to the reader. Research has shown that concentrations of poverty in
neighborhoods contribute to decreased employment opportunities,
among other negative outcomes.133 Part of this is compounded by factors such as lack of access to living-wage jobs or transportation to reach
said jobs.134 With so many job opportunities concentrated in St. Louis’s
counties, it is clear then how such disparities in employment rates exist
between the counties and the City. Ultimately, this disparity is exactly
what HUD aims to correct, particularly given the connection between
low-income communities and the lack of job opportunities afforded to
residents.135
Based on HUD’s reasoning for implementing the AFFH final rule,
affordable housing mandates should take steps to deliver economic
growth and opportunity to have any legitimate force.136 Again,
mandatory inclusionary zoning provides a ready solution. Studies have
shown that the creation of mixed-income communities—the ultimate
outcome of a properly applied mandatory inclusionary zoning scheme—
may help to promote greater access to employment opportunities and
130 ST. LOUIS REG’L CHAMBER, ST. LOUIS MSA – LARGEST EMPLOYERS (2015), http://
www.stlregionalchamber.com/regional-data/documents-library (filter “largest” in Document
Title and select download button for document titled “St. Louis MSA – Largest Employers”).
131 See BROOKINGS INST., MISSED OPPORTUNITY: TRANSIT AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN
AMERICA–ST. LOUIS, MO-IL METRO AREA (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Series/
jobs-and-transit/SaintLouisMO.PDF.
132 Cf. Margaret Simms, Creating Employment Opportunities for Low-Income African
American Men, URB. WIRE: JOB MKT. & LAB. FORCE (May 20, 2015) (“One of the reasons
African American men have difficulty finding work is because they live in segregated communities that lack jobs. . . . [F]ew people have connections to jobs outside the community.”).
133 SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 121, at 10.
134 See, e.g., OR. INCLUSIONARY ZONING COAL., supra note 96, at 4 (explaining the relationship between poverty stricken neighborhoods and lack of access to employment opportunities and transportation).
135 Cf. Press Release, PolicyLink, Low-Income Communities Can’t Get to Jobs: New
Brookings Institution Study Finds Uneven Transit Service Cuts Off Families from Regional
Job Centers (May 12, 2011), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/pr-new-study-highlights-impact-of-uneven-transit-access-on-low-income-communities.pdf (explaining that lowincome residents in suburban neighborhoods of cities have difficulty accessing the majority of
low and middle-skill jobs in their region via transit).
136 Cf. 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (2015) (explaining that the goal of the Final Rule is to
“make program participants better able to evaluate their present environment to assess fair
housing issues such as segregation, conditions that restrict fair housing choice, and disparities
in access to housing and opportunity”).
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better job outcomes.137 With such a concentration of poverty in the
north, St. Louis would likely achieve similar results through a regionwide implementation of mandatory inclusionary zoning. This integration
will hopefully—and most likely—bring low-income St. Louisans closer
to the region’s employment opportunities and curb decade-long patterns
of poverty. Ultimately, through AFFH compliance, city officials have an
opportunity to end this disparity and build a bridge that connects lowincome families and individuals to positions of economic viability.
C. Alternative Approaches and Why Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning
Remains Most Viable
Not every scholar is convinced that an inclusionary zoning regimen
provides the most effective solution to combating the societal inequalities within cities.138 These scholars contend that current inclusionary
zoning programs do not provide enough economic subsidies to make
housing compelling for low-income families and also note skepticism
regarding the capacity for mixed-income housing to actually enhance
community integration.139 As part of his argument regarding the shortcomings of mixed-income housing policies, Robert Ellickson notes how
“most poor minority households do not warm to the prospect of moving
to wealthier white neighborhoods.”140 In the alternative, Ellickson argues that housing voucher programs—government subsidy programs
where the tenant pays a set percentage of rent based on household income and the government provides the rest—are better equipped to create affordable housing and integration.141 Ellickson observes, based on
selected studies, that voucher holders are less likely to end up in areas of
high poverty and that the voucher programs ultimately do more to promote neighborhood economic integration.142 Other studies on housing
voucher programs have noted that these programs create more freedom
137 See DIANE K. LEVY, ZACH MCDADE, & KASSIE DUMLAO, URBAN INST., EFFECTS
FROM LIVING IN MIXED-INCOME COMMUNITIES FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 13 (2010) (noting
several studies that reported increased job opportunities when residents of low-income neighborhoods moved to high-income neighborhoods). But see Fraser, Chaskin, & Bazuin, supra
note 94, at 89 (noting that studies focusing on low-income residents returning to redeveloped
HOPE VI sites, a program with mixed-income housing as its central feature, did not generate
“clear benefits” regarding employment opportunities).
138 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983 (2010).
139 Id. at 1006, 1009–10. Ellickson also argues that “[t]here is substantial evidence that in
some societal contexts the enhancement of opportunities for bridging among members of different social groups simultaneously diminishes internal bonding of an individual group.” Id. at
1009. Ellickson also notes other studies that cast doubt on whether economic integration actually provides meaningful social benefits. Id. at 1015.
140 Id. at 1015.
141 Id. at 1010.
142 Id. at 1011.
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to choose the kinds of housing and locations that best meet the recipients’ needs.143
Notwithstanding these contentions, critics acknowledge the shortcomings inherent in voucher programs—in particular, the lack of social
integration.144 As one study noted, despite noble motivations, these programs can fail to actually subsidize housing units in affluent areas.145 In
fact, many voucher-holders, predominantly due to outside influences,
tend to be concentrated in areas of high to above-average poverty and
these voucher programs do little to combat the racial disparity in the
region.146 As others have acknowledged, mixed-income housing programs may not be a “cure-all,”147 but they nonetheless allow for the creation of affordable housing in areas that have otherwise been off-limits.
Ellickson concedes that (1) the studies he relies on examined the
integrative effects of fully, rather than partially, subsidized projects and
that (2) “mixed-income projects conceivably could foster integration better than housing vouchers.”148 Others have noted this flaw in Ellickson’s
criticism as well, stating that the argument implicitly acknowledges that
no program alone is going to be an effective tool for integration.149 Critically, some literature points out that these voucher programs oftentimes
force voucher-holders to remain in impoverished neighborhoods because
of the significant constraints imposed by the voucher programs’ fair market rent cut-off points.150 And even where the fair market price cut-offs
allow potential tenants to actually afford the housing, many landlords can
refuse to rent to these voucher recipients.151 Because of landlord fears
that voucher-tenants may drive away market-rate tenants, voucher recipients are often trapped in purgatory—despite receiving vouchers, they are
143 See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, URBAN INST., STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE
HOUSING VOUCHER PROGRAM 2 (2003).
144 See Ellickson, supra note 138, at 1010 (discussing how many observers view that the
main shortcomings of Section 8 vouchers is that they do not enhance racial integration). Ellickson’s main focus is on voucher program’s economic integration.
145 See, e.g., Aaron Wiener, This is Where D.C.’s Housing Voucher Recipients Live,
WASH. CITY PAPER (June 12, 2012).
146 See id. (noting that a recent study found that D.C. voucher-holders were concentrated
in areas of higher-than-average poverty). There may be initial reservations regarding integration within areas that have historically been racially homogenous, but as this Note has already
noted, the path towards realizing the effects of a mandatory inclusionary zoning program will
be a long-term process. See supra Part III.A–B.
147 See Matthew Shiers Sternman, Integrating the Suburbs: Harnessing the Benefits of
Mixed-Income Housing in Westchester County and Other Low-Poverty Areas, 44 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 1, 29 (2010).
148 See Ellickson, supra note 138, at 1010.
149 See Sternman, supra note 147, at 28 n.166 (2010).
150 Alana Semuels, How Housing Policy is Failing America’s Poor, ATLANTIC (June 24,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/section-8-is-failing/396650/.
151 Id.
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forced to stay in low-income neighborhoods with no options to escape to
more affluent areas.152
In general, there certainly are advantages to a voucher program—
and indeed the lessons from the successes of such programs could be
applied when constructing an inclusionary zoning program153—but these
programs often fall victim to racial discrimination and segregated housing markets.154 Overall, these voucher programs have not done their job
in promoting residential mobility and choice, especially amongst minority recipients—an issue that would certainly be salient in St. Louis.155
Ellickson may be correct that there are some economic shortcomings inherent in inclusionary zoning,156 and in some cities or towns, an inclusionary program may just not be tenable. But when taking the societal
benefits inherent in inclusionary zoning into account as applied to St.
152 See id. (explaining how, in Dallas, some landlords who owned units throughout the
city would rent to voucher-holders in low-income neighborhoods but not in high-income
neighborhoods).
153 See, e.g., Sternman, supra note 147, at 29 (“The use of mixed-income housing does
not, however, preclude the implementation of other low-income housing programs.”).
154 See TURNER, supra note 143, at 3.
155 Id. at 2.
156 However, it is unclear, at best, that the economic underpinnings of inclusionary zoning
have more shortcomings than benefits. As noted earlier in this Note, there are other studies
that indicate ways to make inclusionary zoning economically palatable to developers. See
supra Part II.A.2. For example, although inclusionary zoning typically targets moderate-income households, these polices can nevertheless use subsidies and incentives to increase the
number of below-market units that developers create. See URBAN LAND INST., THE ECONOMICS OF INCLUSIONARY DEVELOPMENT 7–8 (2016). One can, in turn, argue that the overall
increase in supply of low-income housing will help to lower the price of said housing across
the board, including areas where said affordable housing is being built. Cf. Benjamin Harney,
The Economics of Exclusionary Zoning and Affordable Housing, 38 STETSON L. REV. 459, 475
(noting that the primary goal of any affordable housing program must be to reduce the number
of exclusionary zoning regulations, thereby increasing the low-income housing supply). In
fact, certain studies have reported that, although some areas have had limited production of
affordable housing where inclusionary zoning ordinances are in place, there has been a bountiful development of affordable housing units over a long period of time where inclusionary
zoning policies are allowed to fully take form and grow. See LAURA SWANSON, INCLUSIONARY
ZONING & OTHER POTENTIAL INCENTIVES FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT IN TENNESSEE 8 (2015). These studies have also noted that it is quite possible to create an inclusionary zoning program that is profitable for developers. See id. (noting that it is possible to set
aside twelve to fifteen percent of units as affordable while still allowing developers to earn a
ten percent profit). Thus, Ellickson may be correct that, from a short-term perspective, inclusionary zoning may not move the needle drastically in terms of overall affordability. See Ellickson, supra note 138, at 1006. However, over time the programs can allow developers to
achieve a profit and can help to alleviate concerns of a lack of development of affordable units
by consistently adding to the supply. See SWANSON, supra note 156, at 8. Of course, situations exist where the affordability period mandated by the ordinance expires, thus leading to a
diminishing number of affordable units, but this can be rectified through an increase in the
affordability period mandated by ordinances. See id. In any event, some studies reveal that
mandatory inclusionary zoning, when compared to other affordable housing programs, including housing vouchers, is the best equipped to promote the goal at the heart of this Note—social
integration. See id. at 9.
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Louis, as well as the legitimate historical limitations of housing voucher
programs, one can see how mandatory inclusionary zoning stands out as
the most appealing option to comply with AFFH. By requiring developers to set aside affordable housing options during development,
mandatory inclusionary zoning does what voucher programs often fail to
do—it creates an opportunity to integrate that goes on to facilitate the
various AFFH requirements.
D. Inclusionary Zoning in Real Life—Successes and Challenges
Mandatory inclusionary zoning provides both enticing policy benefits and a legitimate method to establish AFFH Final Rule compliance.
Although the benefits are certainly enticing in theory, one need not look
far to see the real-life effects of inclusionary zoning policies. The zoning
ordinances created by Montgomery County, Maryland, and Nassau
County, New York, exemplify the successes and challenges, respectively, of implementing an inclusionary zoning program.
1. Montgomery County, Maryland—An Example of Success
Montgomery County, a suburb of Washington, D.C., is one of the
pioneers of inclusionary zoning.157 The County developed their program
in 1974 to address the lack of affordability of housing through the development of moderately priced, affordable housing.158 The need for affordability resulted from Montgomery County’s affluence—the County
was (and is) one of the twenty richest counties in the United States.159
The program, titled the “Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit” Program, is straightforward but comprehensive, requiring that up to 15% of
new developments of twenty units or more be moderately priced and that
40% of new developments be offered through public housing agencies
and non-profit housing providers.160 Although deemed “administratively
complex” and subjected to several modifications over time,161 Montgomery County’s program experienced impressive success. Over thirty
years, the program has produced a total of 13,000 affordable units.162
157 URBAN INST., EXPANDING HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING:
LESSONS FROM TWO COUNTIES 8–9 (2012).
158 EDWARD A. TOMBARI, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, SMART GROWTH, SMART
CHOICES SERIES: THE BUILDER’S PERSPECTIVE ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING 3 (2005).
159 Alexandra Holmqvist, The Effect of Inclusionary Zoning on Racial Integration, Economic Integration, and Access to Social Services: A Davis Case Study 11 (2011) (unpublished
master’s thesis, University of California, Santa Cruz) (on file with University of California,
Santa Cruz Office of Graduate Studies).
160 Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., 40 Years Ago: Montgomery County, Maryland Pioneers Inclusionary Zoning, NLIHC.ORG (May 16, 2014), http://nlihc.org/article/40-years-agomontgomery-county-maryland-pioneers-inclusionary-zoning.
161 URBAN INST., supra note 157, at 53.
162 Id. at 5.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-2\CJP205.txt

446

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 28

PUBLIC POLICY

24-APR-17

10:00

[Vol. 26:419

And despite critics’ initial concerns of potentially declining development, Montgomery County’s program has generated a total of $477.4
million of private sector investment in affordable housing programs
across the county.163 More importantly, the program integrated a traditionally homogenous county through increased racial and economic diversity.164 Such success, even in the face of the program’s complexity, is
encouraging for those hoping to replicate similar results in St. Louis.165
2. Nassau County, New York—An Example of the Challenges
Nassau County, New York, a more recent addition to the inclusionary zoning game, has had its fair share of prevalent racial and economic
disparity throughout the area.166 This disparity was tied to a dearth of
affordable housing in the region, an issue that state officials have sought
to mitigate.167 In response, the New York State Legislature passed the
Long Island Workforce Housing Act (“LIWHA”) in 2008, mandating
that new developments set aside 10% of the units to affordable housing
in return for at least a 10% density bonus.168 However, the implementation of this inclusionary zoning policy has been a challenge for Nassau
County. Part of the issue is a lack of direction at the regional level that
has led to disagreement amongst municipalities over the proper implementation of the LIWHA. Some municipalities view the bill as optional
and only a complement to local inclusionary zoning laws—both volun163 BRUNICK, supra note 111, at 6. Despite some economists’ fears that inclusionary zoning would decrease development by making development more costly, developers working in
Montgomery County have characterized inclusionary programs as “part of the cost of doing
business.” URBAN INST., supra note 157, at 25.
164 See KAREN DESTOREL BROWN, BROOKINGS INST., EXPANDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING
THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS FROM THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 16,
27 (2001); Henry G. Cisneros, Regionalism: The New Geography of Opportunity, CITYSCAPE:
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 46–47 (1996) (explaining how inclusionary zoning helped Montgomery County look “more like a ‘rainbow’” by integrating the county with increased population diversity).
165 Of course, the program is not immune from challenges. As one study has noted, expiring price regulations have led to a decrease in affordable units in Montgomery County, a
decline in construction will lead to a decline in the number of affordable units created, and the
public sentiment remains a barrier to future construction of affordable housing units. See
BROWN, supra note 164, at 17–21. Even so, these are issues that can likely be mitigated
through a mix of mandatory inclusionary zoning and longer mandated affordability periods for
the newly developed housing.
166 See INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, RACISM AND THE OPPORTUNITY DIVIDE ON LONG
ISLAND 10 (2002) (explaining the large gap in household poverty rates between black and
white residents in Nassau County and Suffolk County).
167 See id. at 11 (“Nassau-Suffolk is among the most racially segregated residential areas
in the country.”).
168 POPULAR CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY, THE CRISIS OF FAIR, AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON
LONG ISLAND 7 (2015).
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tary and mandatory—in place.169 Others view it as a mandate.170 Such
confusion has stagnated the development of affordable housing in the
area.171 The challenges of implementing inclusionary zoning in Nassau
County—and more generally Long Island—highlight the need for an integrated, region-wide policy. More importantly, the expectations and
goals must be clearly communicated across the region, particularly where
there are a multitude of municipalities with differing views on the promulgation of affordable housing through zoning.172
CONCLUSION
St. Louis has a problem. With the promulgation of HUD’s Final
Rule for AFFH potentially affecting fair housing funding in the region,
finding a practicable remedy is more imperative than ever. To that end,
inclusionary zoning provides a legitimate solution.
Although plagued by socially and economically segregated communities, St. Louis has the potential to benefit from an inclusionary zoning
plan. By implementing a regional mandatory inclusionary zoning policy
to increase the availability of affordable housing through the development of mixed-income communities, St. Louis could revitalize stagnant
and segregated neighborhoods while preserving and rehabilitating existing affordable housing in the area. Further, a mandatory inclusionary
zoning program, over the course of time,173 should help to increase the
housing choices for St. Louisans of all income levels and create greater
access to social resources, education, and employment opportunities that
for years have been unattainable. These gains would do more than
enough to immediately satisfy the main requirements of HUD’s Final
Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing. Above all else, these
benefits over the course of time will help St. Louis to reap substantial
socioeconomic gains by breaking down the barriers of communities traditionally proscribed to low-income—and often ethnically diverse—St.
Louisans. By taking steps to include the excluded, St. Louis can begin to
institute a fundamental paradigm shift towards the path of social integration, economic revitalization, and increased prosperity.
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Id. at 8.
Id.
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, at 589–616 (2d Cir. 2016)
(describing the opposition of Garden City residents to rezoning ordinances that would increase
the number of affordable housing units in the area).
173 As previously mentioned, any social and economic benefits that mandatory inclusionary zoning may provide will be realized over the course of decades. The current state of St.
Louis is the product of decades of segregative practices—to reverse the results will likely
require an equal amount of time.
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